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I.

INTRODUCTION

Things done for gain are nought
But great things done endure . . .
Let me pay in a minute Life's glad
arrears of pain, darkness and cold.
from Robert Browning's Prospice,
In the southern polar region of the world lies a landmass, the
continent of Antarctica, that is the "epitome of remoteness and inac-

1. During an expedition to Antarctica, the ship of British explorer, Ernest Shackelton,
became entrapped in the Weddell Sea pack ice in 1915, and sank. Forced ashore, Shackelton
and his men trudged across the frozen continent to McMurdo Sound, where some of Shackelton's
men met their fate. The lines by Robert Browning, quoted in the introduction, constitute an
epitaph relating to that fateful time at McMurdo. W. SULLIVAN, WHITE LAND OF ADVENTURE
71 (1957); M. FISHER & J. FISHER, SHACKELTON 376-77 (1957).
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cessibility. ' '2 Antarctica is bordered by the massive Southern Ocean 3
- haven for a bountiful marine life and probably the world's grandest
ecosystem. 4 In addition, recent exploration has bolstered predictions
that a "vast wealth" of mineral resources exists both onshore and off. 5
Progression of time and technology has led many to believe that exploitation of this mineral wealth hidden beneath Antarctica's seemingly
impervious icecap is, or soon will be, a tenable and economically feasible notion.6 Indeed, this bleak frozen wilderness, where once only
fearless explorers and curious scientists ventured, is now viewed by
world leaders - particularly those of the Third World - as a source
for depleting fuel, food, and freshwater supplies. 7 However, materialization of this view through peaceful and environmentally protective
means is stymied by an international politico-legal quagmire.
Beginning in 1908, one nation after another staked claims - some
coterminous - to select "pie slice" wedges of the pristine continent.8
The legitimacy of these claims has been a matter of international
dissonance. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, are
refusing to recognize any claim, yet are simultaneously reserving the

2. de Blij, A Regional Geography of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 299 (1978). With a distance of 1,600 miles from Antarctica, New Zealand's South Island
is the closest "substantial population concentration." Id.
3. The Southern Ocean constitutes about 10% of the world's oceans. Joyner, The Southern
Ocean and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165
(1985). See generally Kesteven, The Southern Ocean, in OCEAN YEARBOOK I 467 (E. Borgese
& N. Ginsburg eds. 1978); Deacon, The Southern Ocean, in THE SEA 281 (N. Hill ed. 1963).

4.

Hedgpeth, The Antarctic Marine Ecosystem, in

ADAPTATIONS WITHIN ANTARCTIC

3 (G. Llano ed. 1977) ("probably the largest marine ecosystem on the globe").
See Scully, The Marine Living Resources of the Southern Ocean, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341,
341-42 (1978).
5. Almond, Demilitarizationand Arms Control: Antarctica, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 229, 230 (1985); Dugger, Exploiting Antarctic Mineral Resources - Technology, Economics,
and the Environment, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315 (1978). But see Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty
System as a Resource Management Mechanism - Nonliving Resources, in ANTARCTIC TREATY
SYSTEM: AN ASSESSMENT 269, 269, 271-72 (1986) ("the mythology is that Antarctica is a vast
reservoir of [mineral] wealth") [emphasis added].
6. See Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 371, 372 (1978).
7. Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 691, 692 (1981) (citing J.
GRANGER, TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979)); see W. WESTERMEYER,
THE POLITICS OF MINERAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN ANTARCTICA xiii (1984).
8. The United Kingdom was first to advance a claim (1908), followed by New Zealand
(1923), France (1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1942).
Comment, Criminal Jurisdictionin Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 489-90 (1978).
ECOSYSTEMS
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right to stake their own claims.9 To quell such volatility, the Antarctic
Treaty (Treaty, Regime, or Treaty Regime) was painstakingly devised
and subsequently ratified on June 23, 1961, by twelve nations with
interests in the region. 1° Today, the Treaty comprises an aggregate
of sixteen nation signatories, and that number is likely to increase."
Some of the Treaty's important features are that it demilitarizes
Antarctica, 12 assures freedom for scientific research, promotes interna-

9. Id. at 490. See also infra note 97 and accompanying text.
10. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, [June 23, 1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71. The Treaty text is reprinted infra, Appendix I. "Regiminal," when capitalized in
this article, refers to the Treaty Regime.
The Treaty provisions and subsequently adopted recommendations and measures - binding
on the Treaty members - comprise the Regime which governs Antarctica. See infra notes
142-48 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations and measures).
Treaty members include the original signatories: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a "Purgatory
of Ambiguity"?, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195, 195 n.4 (1985). Nations which have since
become members of the pact include: (1) Poland in 1977, (2) the Republic of Germany in 1981,
and (3) Brazil and India in 1983. Id. at 195; Bruckner, The Antarctic Treaty System from the
Perspective of a Non Consultative Party to the Antarctic Treaty, in ANTARCTIC TREATY
SYSTEM 315, 315-16 (1986) (providing specific dates of accession).
A "contracting" or "acceding" nation does not achieve consultative status until it exhibits
"substantial" interest by conducting scientific research in Antarctica, or by other acceptable
means. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, at art. IX(2) reprinted infra Appendix I; see also
infra note 114 and accompanying text. If a consultative nation's "substantial activities" discontinue, that nation's "consultative" status will lapse. See W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at
31. The original signatories are also referred to as contracting parties; however, they do not
have to meet the test of acceding nations. F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 147-53
(1982). See infra text accompanying note 112 (list of acceding nations which have yet to gain
consultative status).
Nations which are members of the United Nations may accede to the Treaty; however, a
nation not a member of the U.N. may accede via invitation by all consultative parties. See
infra note 113 and accompanying text.
Difficulty in achieving consultative states (i.e., Poland was the first and only acceding nation
to achieve the status in sixteen years since ratification) lends credence to charge that Treaty
members constitute an elitist "Antarctic club." See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
Contracting and consultative nations meet biannually; organization and hosting of meetings
is a task Treaty members incur on a rotational basis. See Triggs, supra note 10, at 195. Objectives
of these meetings include: (1) exchange of information (2) consultation of related matters of
common interest, and (3) consideration, formulation, and recommendation of measures supporting
the objectives of the Treaty. See generally Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, reprinted infra
Appendix I.
11. See Chart, infra Appendix II (listing Treaty signatories).
12. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, at art. I reprinted infra Appendix I. Nuclear testing
and radioactive waste disposal are also prohibited. Id. at art. V.
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tional cooperation through exchange of information and personnel, and
furthers efforts to protect the environment and conserve living resources.' 3 Regrettably, the Treaty fails to address specifically many
issues, including mineral resource exploration and ekploitation.14 This
failure, in addition to other evolving factors, could lead to the collapse
of the twenty-seven year old Treaty. 5 Hence, the world community,
through cooperative efforts, has to devise a plan to prevent this collapse. The scheme has to (1) be equitable, altruistic, and efficacious;
(2) account for the potential applicability in Antarctic waters of the
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention;16 and (3) dissipate
competing international interests.
This article highlights the essential components of a framework
upon which the scheme could be predicated. However, first, this article
will (1) briefly describe Antarctica's treacherous environmental and
geographical conditions, the formidable nature of which arguably substantiates the cynics' claim that resource exploitation is merely a visionary idea; (2) sketch the history of significant activities and events
in the icy region, beginning with early exploration and concluding with
the conception of an international treaty; (3) present an overview of
the Antarctic Treaty which will be reviewed in a mere three years;
and (4) consider and analyze problems and proposed solutions concerning regional management.

13.
14.
15.

Id. at arts. II & III.
See Alexander, supra note 6, at 373.
Bilder, The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica, in THE

NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES

NEW

167 (Charney ed. 1982) ("[R]esource explo-

ration and exploitation in Antarctica could challenge the stability of the present . . . legal and
political regime and threaten the [region's] environment."); see Beeby, supra note 5, at 271
("unregulated exploitation of antarctic minerals . . . would present a threat to the Antarctic
Treaty"); Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1983, at A33, col. 1 (reporting the United Nations "launched
an international debate on the status of the Antarctic and the exploitation of its resources").
16. For discussions concerning environmental impact of mismanagement in Antarctica, see
generally BENNINGTON & BONNER, MAN'S IMPACT ON THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: A
PROCEDURE FOR EVALUATING IMPACTS FROM SCIENTIFIC AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES 44
(1985); J. BARNES, LET'S SAVE ANTARCTICA (1983); POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
OF MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN ANTARCTICA (J. Zumberge ed. 1979);
Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259 (1986); Joyner, supra note 3.
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THE SETTING: THE SOUTHERN POLAR REGION

Appreciating the harshness and hostility of the continent's
environment is essential to understanding the complexities
of managing Antarctica.
17
Joyner & Theis
The southern polar region "is the coldest, driest, windiest, least
accessible, worst known and generally the most unpleasant" area in
the world. 1 Such extreme, uninviting conditions mean severe constraints on activities including resource exploration and exploitation.
The continent has been referred to metaphorically as a "giant ice
cube" with a surface area of 5.5 million square miles. 19 Actually, the
continent is nearly circular and is composed of solid bedrock, of which
ninety-eight percent is covered with glacial ice.2° The average thickness
of this ice mantle is two or three miles.21

17. Joyner & Theis, The United States and Antarctica: Rethinking the Interplay of Law
and Interest, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65, 68 (1987).

18. Mitchell & Tinker, Antarctica and Its Resources, Earthscan Press Briefing Document
No. 21, at 1 (1979).
In this sort of cold.... if you drop a steel bar it is likely to shatter like glass,
tin disintegrates into loose granules, mercury freezes into a solid metal, and if you
haul up a fish through a hole in the ice within five seconds it is frozen so solid it
has to be cut with a saw.
I. CAMERON, ANTARCTICA: THE LAST CONTINENT 14 (1974), cited in Joyner & Theis, supra
note 17, at 69 n.12.
For a detailed discussion concerning the Antarctic setting (i.e., climate, geography), see
generally D. SHAPLEY, THE SEVENTH CONTINENT: ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE 1-19
(1985) (includes interesting photographs and sketchings); de Blij, supra note 2, at 305.
19. Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward InternationalLegal Institutions
Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA. L. REV. 421, 425 (1979). This area is comparable to
that of the United States and Europe combined. Id.
20. Joyner & Theis, supra note 17, at 68; de Blij, supra note 2, at 307. The remaining two
percent is ice-free during the austral summer. Burton, supra note 19, at 425. See also Potter,
Economic Potentials of the Antarctic, ANTARCTIC J. OF THE UNITED STATES, May-June 1969.
at 61.
21. de Blij, supra note 2, at 307; Potter, supra note 20, at 61. While mountains like the
Trans-Antarctic peak from 5,000-15,000 feet above sea level, "only a few hundred feet protrude
above the ice." Burton, supra note 19, at 425. For a more detailed discussion of the Antarctic
glacial ice sheet, see Gow, The Ice Sheet, in ANTARCTICA 221 (T. Hatherton ed. 1965). For a
diagram of landscape regions and cross-sections of continent, see A. STRAHLER & A. STRAHLER,
ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 407 (1976).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/1

6

Bergin: Antarctica,
the Antarctic
Regime,
and Legal and Geopolitic
EXPLORATION
RESOURCE
NATURAL Treaty
ANTARCTICA:

The Antarctic coast is bordered by floating but immobile "ice
shelves" held in place, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, by tiers of islands
and large mainland bays.- Beyond the shelves is a "thick, compact,
and virtually impenetrable" mass of sluggishly drifting pack ice. During
winter months (February to October), pack ice extends up to 1,000
miles seaward;m icebergs are more abundant; and ocean travel is
hazardous and nearly impossible.The Antarctic region has also been described as a "white desert."
Rainfall is scarce, and plant life is comprised of algae, fungi, lichens,
and mosses.- An average annual snowfall of 4.7 to 5.9 inches is about
the only form of precipitation.2 6
Antarctica's climate is the coldest on Earth. Average temperatures
range from forty below zero degrees Fahrenheit (-40'F) to ninety-four
below zero degrees Fahrenheit (-94°F) during the coldest winter
months,- and zero degrees Fahrenheit (0°F) to thirty-one below zero
degrees Fahrenheit (-31F) during the warmest summer months.2
Bone-chilling winds, some with a velocity of 200 miles per hour, blow
constantly and without warning, making human activity unsafe.- Finally, Antarctica is a "dark continent"; from October to March, the
region receives minimal to no sunlight.30

22. de Bilij, supra note 2, at 308. For a more extensive discussion of Antarctic ice shelves,
see generally Swinthinbank, The Ice Shelves, in ANTARCTICA, supra note 21, at 199.
23. Joyner & Theis, supra note 17, at 68-69; de Blij, supra note 2, at 305; Potter, supra
note 20, at 61.
24. Potter, supra note 20, at 61. Ocean travel is easier and safer during the winter months
when pack ice extends only a few hundred miles. Id.
25. de Blij, supra note 2, at 307-8; see also Gow, supra note 21, at 225; Joyner & Theis,
supra note 17, at 70.
26. de Blij, supra note 2, at 307; Burton, supra note 19, at 425 (citing U.S. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, POLAR REGIONS ATLAS 35 (1978) (Melted snow and ice are the
main supply of freshwater on the continent.).
27. Rubin, Antarctic Meteorology, in FROZEN FUTURE 162 (R. Lewis & P. Smith eds.
1973), cited in de Blij, supra note 2, at 307. The Russian Antarctica station, Vorstock, recorded
the coldest temperature, -128.6' F., on July 23, 1983. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF
FACTS 1985, at 760 (H. Lane ed. 1984).
28. Rubin, supra note 27, at 162, cited in Burton, supra note 19, at 425. The warmest
temperatures have reached +500 F. de Blij, supra note 2, at 307.
29. B. BREWSTER, ANTARCTICA: WILDERNESS AT RISK 5 (1982); I. CAMERON, supra
note 18, at 14.
30. Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 5.
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FROM DISCOVERY TO DIPLOMACY:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Antarctica... has been throughout history ... a source
of theories, fantasy, incredible heroism, commercial activity,
and sometimes thinly disguised greed; of enormous scientific
knowledge, conflict, and imaginative solutions. It has
brought out the best in the human spirit and occasionally
the worst.
- Cristian Maquieira 31
A.

Early Exploration

Who discovered Antarctica? No one knows for certain.32 The French
claim that explorer Bouvet de Lozier discovered an island, later named
for him, off the coast of the continent in 1739. 3 The British claim (1)
that Captain James Cook "circumnavigated the continent" and discovered the island, South Georgia; 34 (2) that Edward Bransfield of the
Royal Navy was first to sight the mainland; 35 and (3) that Sir James
Ross in 1841 sliced through the pack ice for the first time and actually
reached the coast.3- The Russians, however, contend it was their own
Admiral Fabian von Bellinghausen of the Imperial Navy who first
sighted the continental mainland sometime during 1819 to 1823 while
in search of the South Pole. 37 Not surprisingly, Americans refute all

31.

Maquieira, Antarctica Priorto the Antarctic Treaty: A Politicaland Legal Perspective,

in Beeby, supra note 5, at 49. For a detailed account of Antarctica's history, see generally D.
SHAPLEY, supra note 18, at 1-88.
32. See D. SHAPLEY, supra note 18, at 23 ("three-way tug-of-war among the United States,
Great Britain and the Soviet Union over whose mariners discovered the Antarctic continent");
Alexander, supra note 6, at 374 (citing Gould, Antarctica in World Affairs, 128 HEADLINE
SER. 3, 12-18 (1958); Sullivan, Antarctica in a Two-Power World, 36 FOREIGN AFF. 154, 155
(1957-58)). Belief that a great landmass (Antarctica) exists in the southern region of the world
antedates the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece. In 600 B.C., Phythagoras conjectured this
landmass in the Southern Hemisphere exists as a "balance" to those lands that exist in the
Northern Hemisphere (Pythagoras believed the world is spherical). See generally Hatherton,
Antarctica Prior to the Antarctic Treaty - A Historical Perspective, in Beeby, supra note 5,
at 15-17; Rutford, Summary of Science in Antarctica Priorto and Including the International
Geophysical Year, in Beeby, supra note 5, at 87.

33. Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 7.
34. Id. One source notes that Captain Cook never actually saw the mainland of Antarctica
due to impenetrable pack ice. Cook supposedly wrote in a travel log that if an icy landmass
(Antarctica) did exist beyond the pack ice, it (the landmass) would "be so bleak that the world
would derive no benefit from it." Id.
35. Alexander, supra note 6, at 374.
36. Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 7.
37. Id.; Alexander, supra note 6, at 374.
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claims of others "being first to discover," and provide their own version: New England sealer, Nathaniel Palmer, was first.s
Since the discovery of Antarctica, nationals from other countries
have ventured into the desolate iceland and have etched their mark.
These adventurers travelled from Argentina, Australia, Chile, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden 9 From 1778 to
1898, whaling and sealing expeditions off the coast of Antarctica totaled
in the hundreds.4 ° While commercial interest flourished, a Belgian,
Lieutenant Adrien de Gerlache de Gomery, and his men, were first
to overwinter in Antarctica when their ship, Belgica, became entrap41
ped in the pack ice.
Today, about 2,300 people live in the hostile Antarctic region. This
group consists primarily of scientists from twelve nations. As a means
to survival, habitation occurs on a temporary, rotational basis.42
B.

Claims of Sovereignty

[S]overeignty [in Antarctica] is real. It remains real, notwithstanding the fact that other states do not acknowledge
that it is validly exercised; and it would be quite unrealistic
to entertain the belief that sovereignty will be abandoned
either in form or in substance.
-

Keith Brennan'

38. Palmer supposedly discovered Antarctica sometime during the time the Russians claim
von Bellinghausen did. Id.
39. For a brief, but detailed, discussion of the explorers and their accomplishments in the
Antarctic region, see generally Hatherton, supra note 32, at 15-32; Mitchell & Tinker, supra
note 18, at 7-8.
40. Soon after Captain Cook reported sightings of fur seal colonies in the Antarctic region,
at least 102 American and British ships - between 1778 and 1791 - were in the area "taking
fur seal pelts and elephant seal oil." At least 325 whaling and sealing expeditions from the
United States, England, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, France, and Argentina occurred
annually in the Southern Ocean. For further discussion, see ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY:
SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 13-15 (0. Vicuna ed. 1983) (collection of papers
prepared for the Conference on Antarctic Resources Policy held in Antarctica, on Oct. 6-9, 1982)
[hereinafter ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY].
41. Id. at 14; Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 7.
42. For example, during the winter of 1977-78, 749 people from various nations inhabited
the continent of Antarctica. Approximately 2,300 inhabited the continent during the summer.
Over thirty stations used for scientific research are operated year-round. Antarctica has been
inhabited - on a rotational basis - since 1958. Burton, supra note 19, at 427.
43. Brennan, Criteriafor access to the resources of Antarctica:alternatives, procedureand
experience applicable, in ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY, supra note 40, at 218.
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The history of nations' sovereignty claims in Antarctica has been
4
retold in law review symposia, treaties, and even movies." For purposes of brevity and avoidance of undue repetition, a chart portraying
present territorial claims by the various nations is provided. These
claims are based on one or more of a number of principles such as
historic right, contiguity and proximity, geological affinity, sector,
Pan-American primacy, effective occupation, discovery, symbolic act,
and subjugation.
1. Historic Right
Several nations argue that their territorial claims in the Antarctic
45
region are legitimately based on "historic right", or uti possidetis.
For example, Argentina and Chile claim they are the legitimate heirs
to Spain's property rights in Antarctica. These inheritance rights stem
from Argentina's and Chile's succession from Spain in 1810 when Spain
6
owned half the world including Antarctica. 4 Spain was awarded the
New World by Pope Alexander VII via issuance of the four Papal
Bulls in 1493, and all lands west of the 46th meridian "from the Arctic
47
to the Antarctic Poles" a year later via the Treaty of Tordesillas.

44. See, e.g., ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY, supra note 40; The InternationalLegal
Regime for Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155 (1986); Antarctica, 17 CASE W. RES. J.
INTL L. 165 (1985); Antarctic Resources: A New InternationalChallenge, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 285 (1978); Scott of the Antarctic (1948) (movie depicting British explorer, Robert F.
Scott, leading an ill-fated expedition to the South Pole in 1912); National Geographic Explorer:
Great Explorers with Byrd at the South Pole (TBS television broadcast, Dec. 13, 1987) (actual
film footage of Commander Richard E. Byrd's 800-mile flight to the South Pole in 1928 from
his settlement, Little America, near the Antarctic coast).
45. See generally Fisher, The Arbitrationof the Guatemalan-HonduranBoundary Dispute,
27 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 415-16 (1933), for further discussion on this theory which has been
applied in Central and South America to substantiate claims.
46. One author questions "whether Spain could bequeath to its former colonies [i.e., Argentina and Chile] lands that it did not possess, had never seen, and could not place on a map."
P. QUIGG, A POLE APART 114 (1983). See also Note, Thaw in InternationalLaw? Rights in
Antarctica Under Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804, 814 (1978) (Argentina and Chile's
claims under this historical rights theory "are arcane and cannot be taken seriously").
47. P. QuiGG, supra note 46, at 113-14 (quoting 0. PINOCHET DE LA BARRA, CHILEAN
SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA 10 (Santiago: Editorial Pacifico 1955)). Pope Alexander was
arbiter between Portugal and Spain - two nations whose navigators were exploring and discovering much land. The four Bulls and the treaty were the results of the arbitration or compromise.
Id. at 113. Portugal was awarded the other half of the world. Conforti, Territorial Claims in
Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249, 255
(1987).
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2.

Continguity and Proximity

"Contiguity" and "proximity" are other rationales Argentina and
Chile provide to substantiate their claims in Antarctica. From a legal
perspective, a claim based on contiguity is a stronger argument than
that based on proximity.4 Under the former theory, a claim staked
in one portion of a geographical region extends to the remaining portion.49 Argentina and Chile have argued that Antarctica is contiguous
to their homelands.However, contiguity as a rationale for a claim in Antarctica has
been described as far fetched: "[w]hen hundreds or thousands of miles
of ocean separate landmasses, it stretches common sense to assert
that they are contiguous."51 Consequently, substantiation of claims are
"increasingly" based on the latter theory of proximity. 52 Proximity is
used primarily by Argentina and Chile "to discredit the [overlapping]
British claim. ' '
3.

Geological Affinity

"Geological affinity" is another theoretical basis to Chile's claim in
Antarctica. For example, Chile argues that "since structurally the
Antarctic Peninsula and Ellsworth Land are a continuation of the
Andes, these regions are natural extensions of Chile. "- However, one
scholar reveals the flaw in this argument by showing that the polar
plateau and the Transantarctic Mountains are in no way connected to
the Chilean Andes. 55
Argentinian claims of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, based
on the geological affinity principle, are "directly related to Antarc-

48. P. QuIGG, supra note 46, at 115.
49. The contiguity theory is also referred to as the porpinquity theory. See generally
Wright, Territorial Propinquity, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1918). One author even equates
continguity with the sector principle. See W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 33. Another
author seems to indicate that continguity is also the basis for "triangular" delineation of Antarctic
claims. Such "triangular" delineation is normally based on the sector principle. See Conforti,
supra note 47, at 254-55 (rejecting use of contiguity theory in Antarctica).
50. P. QUIGG, supra note 46, at 115.
51.

Id.

52.

"By a small margin, the argument favors Chile over Argentina." Id.

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

11

Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

tica. '" Disputing the British claim, Argentina argued that the islands
are a "geologic continuation of the Andes reappearing as the Antartandes.

' 57

This dispute was settled by the brief, well-publicized war

in 1982, which led to Argentina's surrender.5
4. Sector Principle
As discussed, the boundary lines of the claims were plotted by the
various nations from 1908 to 1943. 59 The so-called "sector principle,"

first introduced in the Arctic region by Canadian Senator Pascal
Poirier, was introduced in Antarctica during these claimant years, and
it ultimately changed the region into a "sliced pie." Nations merely
staked their claims to an area of the frozen continent, and then extended the boundaries from coast to pole to coast to form triangular
territories. One commentator aptly describes the claimant nations'
theoretical basis for delineating their territory in the following manner:
"[i]t 'boils down to a somewhat elaborate [and unfair] way of asking
for more.' 60
With the exception of Norway, all claimant nations unsurprisingly
support the sector principle.sl Most scholars adhere to the position of

56. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 55. "Falkland Islands" is the name recognized by the
British; "Islas Malvinas" is the name recognized by the Argentinians. THE AMERICAN DESK
ENCYCLOPEDIA 407 (Rosenbaum ed. 1984). For a detailed historical account of the dispute,
see generally R. PERL, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS (1983).
57. F. AUBURN, supranote 10, at 55 (citing J. FRAGA, INTRODUCCION A LA GEOPOLITICA
ANTARTICA

25 (1978)).

58. On April 2, 1982, Argentina seized the Falkland Islands - including South Georgia
and South Sandwich Islands. On April 25, Argentine troops in South Georgia surrendered to
the British military and, on June 14, troops in the Falkland Islands surrendered. On June 6,
Argentine personnel in Thule and South Sandwich Islands surrendered. R. PERL, supra note
56, at 84 85.
59. Great Britain was first to claim in 1908 when the Falkland Island Dependencies were
created by the British Letters Patent. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 17 n.116; see also Waldock,
Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1948).
In 1943, Argentina laid claim to its territory in a "Note" to the United Kingdom. F. AUBURN,
supra,note 10, at 17 n.117. But see Conforti, supra note 47, at 253 (Chile was the last claimant).
60. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 31 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1
PLEADINGS 472 (1968)). See generally Mouton, The InternationalRegime of the PolarRegions,
in 3 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243-45 (1962)
(discussing sector principle); Svarlien, The Sector Principle in Law and Practice, 10 POLAR
REC. 248 (1960).
61. P. QUIGG, supra note 46, at 115. Canada and Russia applied the theory in the Arctic

region. T.

TARACOUZIO, SOVIETS IN THE ARCTIC

United States -

all with interests in the region -
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the United States and do not recognize its legitimacy.62 Similarly,
international legal arenas have not been a receptive battleground for
sector-based claims.6
5.

Pan-American Primacy

The theory of Pan-American primacy is premised on the close
geologic and geographic location of Antarctica to American territory
and particularly South American territory.6 Interestingly, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt provided this theory's evolution. In 1939, the
United States was planning to establish bases in Antarctica as a means
to secure future claims in the south polar region. To the Latin American nations, however, such expansionism could have been viewed as
a threat to their regional interests. Thus, pursuant to Roosevelt's
personal decision, the United States announced that its activities in
the Antarctic region would be conducted on behalf of all American
Republics. The United States assured Latin America and South
America that the profits of the United States' ventures in this "South
American sector" would be shared by all. However, conflicts of interest
resulted in an almost immediate decrease of support from the United
States for a Pan-American Antarctica.65

theory to support Arctic claims on the basis of freedom of the seas and lack of effective occupation.
Conforti, supra note 47, at 253-54.
For further discussion on the development of the sector principle in the Arctic and Antarctica,
see generally F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 17-38.
62. See, e.g., W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 33 ("In light of the provisions of the .
Law of the Sea Convention the sector principle has become, for all practical purposes, a
dead issue."); P. QUIGG, supra note 46, at 116 ("the so called sector theory . . . has never
become established in international law") (quoting Judge Philip Jessup of the International Court
of Justice); F. AUBURN, supranote 10, at 31 ("the consensus of commentators from non-claimant
states is firmly opposed to [the principle]"); Conforti, supra note 47, at 254 ("many legal scholars"
have rejected the theory). But see id. ("perhaps the sector principle has some legal basis")
(citing G. BATTAGLINI, LA CONDIZIONE DELL' ANTARTIDE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
126-29 (1971)).
63. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 31 ("Sectors have no support from international tribunals. ").
64. P. QUIGG, supra note 46, at 117.
65. For example, recognition by the United States of a "South American Antarctica" could
be viewed as recognition of Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and rejection of
the United Kingdom's claim to sovereignty. This politically "sticky" situation could jeopardize
the United States' close relations with both Argentina and the United Kingdom. See generally
F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 55-56; Hayton, PolarProblems and InternationalLaw, 52 AM.
J. INT'L L. 746, 756 (1958).
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Chile and Argentina sustained the idea for a Pan-American Antarctica. In 1941, they mutually proclaimed an intention to exercise "exclusive rights" over the "South American Antarctic. "66 As a result, six
years later, they strengthened their agreement with the enactment
67
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
6. Effective Occupation
Effective occupation is the only theory "universally recognized in
international law" as evidenced by opinions rendered in four oftencited cases. To determine which party nation had a superior claim in.
the area of dispute, the cases, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland69
and Island of Palmas,70 used the test of "continuous and peaceful
display of State authority." ClippertonIsland 1 legitimized sovereignty
over uninhabited territory under the following reasoning:
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the
force of law, besides the animus occupandi, the actual, and
not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary condition
of occupation .... Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact
that it was completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment

66. Hayton, The "American"Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INTL L. 583, 583-610 (1956). Chile and
Argentina use this argument primarily to assert superior claims over Britain's. P. QuIGG, supra
note 46, at 117.
67. The 1947 treaty defined the area in which exclusive rights are claimed to extend from
north pole to south pole and between coordinates 24 and 90 degrees west. P. QuiGG, supra
note 46, at 117.
68. Id. at 117-18 [emphasis added].
69. (Denmark v. Norway), 1931 P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No 53, at 45. In this case, disputed
claims by Denmark and Norway in uninhabited and uninviting eastern Greenland were at issue.
The Permanent Court of International Justice determined Denmark had the superior claim based
on its "peaceful and continuous display of State authority over the island," Id. at 45. It seems,
however, that Denmark did not actually occupy the area in dispute; because of the "severe
physical character of eastern Greenland," Denmark was only able to conduct "intermittent and
inextensive" activities there. Alexander, supra note 6, at 393 94.
70. (United States v. Netherlands), 2 UNRIAA 829 (1928), reprinted in 22 Am.J. INT'L
L. 867 (1928). In this case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration awarded the Netherlands the
uninhabited Island of Palmas based on its (the Netherlands') "continuous and peaceful display
of State authority." Id. at 911. The United States argued that its right to the area in dispute
was legitimately based on discovery. Alexander, supra note 6, at 394.
71. (France v. Mexico), Jan. 28, 1931, reprinted in 26 AM. J. INTL L. 390 (1932). In 1858,
a French naval officer claimed for his country a small uninhabited island in the Pacific Ocean.
The only subsequent act of sovereignty exercised by France involved an 1897 sailing by one of
its warships to the island. One month later, a Mexican warship sailed to the island and claimed
sovereignty. Arbitration settled the dispute; France was awarded the island. See generally id.
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when the occupying State makes its appearance there, at
the absolute and undisputed disposition of that State, from
that moment the taking of possession must be considered as
accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.Finally, in Minquiers and Ecreho,73 administrative, judicial, and
legislative actions substantiated effective occupation displayed by the
claimant nation in the disputed territory. These cases clearly indicate
that a nation may use effective occupation to claim territorial
sovereignty; however, their rationales are confusing and inconsistent.74
Moreover, the length of time a nation has to occupy an area effectively
before it can assert a legal claim is an unresolved issue. Solutions to
this issue have ranged from thirty-nine years to two centuries. 75
Permanent habitation in Antarctica has yet to occur. Would continuous activity at a research station serve as a legitimate basis to
assert a claim of effective occupation?6 If so, which nation with stations
in the region has the superior claim? What criteria is necessary (i.e.,
type and duration of activity)?7 Moreover, what proof of occupancy
is required?
ABC News' Nightline, hosted by Ted Koppel, reported that the
United States currently spends $100 million on research programs in

72. Id. at 392.
73. (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 1953 I.C.J. 47. Islets located in the English Channel were claimed
by France and Great Britain. Most of the islets were uninhabitable. Evidence included ancient
claims and historical events, which favored Great Britain.
74. See Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu tai (Senkaku) Islands and
the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 240 (1974) ("[I]t is not surprising
that many scholars in the field have expressed profound bewilderment and confusion over...
the principle of discovery occupation."). Cheng basically equates "discovery-occupation" with
the theory of effective occupation.
75. Id. at 239.
76. Argentina has supposedly conducted activity at its weather station on Laurie Island on
a continual basis since 1904, and Chile has supposedly had an established base in the Antarctic
since 1947. P. QUIGG, supra note 46, at 118.
In one case, the International Court of Justice opined that effective occupation consists of a
"series of acts" by a nation with an intention to claim sovereignty in an uninhabited area. These
"acts" should be committed over an undetermined length of time. See (Fr. v. Mex.), Jan. 28,
1931, reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 393 (1932); see also Alexander, supra note 6, at
412-13. For an analysis of this case, see generally M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC,
LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 844 (1963).
77. Some scholars have suggested that for effective occupation to validate a claim to territory, a nation must be in possession from twenty to forty years. See F. AUBURN, supra note
10, at 9; see also Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 297, 320-32 (1975)
for a detailed discussion of various views concerning the effective occupation argument.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

15

Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

Antarctica. 78 An underlying rationale for providing extensive funding
is "to maintain a large presence in Antarctica, both scientific and
political; the presence is a hedge in case the Treaty falls apart." 79 In
other words, if the Treaty ultimately fails, the United States would
finally claim a "large piece" of Antarctica based on its intensive presence and extensive monetary devotion.- Whether this form of effective occupation would suffice to legitimize a potential claim by the
United States, or any other nation, is yet to be seen. To date, international accord concerning answers to these and other related questions is nonexistent.
7. Discovery
Discovery of a region in Antarctica alone does not adequately
legitimize a claim; "[t]itle must be consummated by possession, ''81 or
effective occupation. This understanding stems from the difficulty of
determining who actually discovered what region and when. 8 2 For
example, "[m]ountains found by an Argentinian flight in 1955 were
'discovered' by the United States in 1956 and the United Kingdom in
1957."1
Another problem with when discovery claims occurred is when
scientists verified the discovery. The peculiar and physical conditions
of the cold Antarctic region can cause deception to a discoverer. For
example, low-lying clouds have been mistaken for islands; shadowy
icebergs have been erroneously perceived to be islands; sometimes,
Antarctic "lands" turned out to be mere mirages.- 4

78. The research program is run by the United States National Science Foundation. See
Nightline: Antarctica and the Treaty Regime (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 1987) (video tape
on file with author).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 6. See also Alexander, supra note 6, at 391 ("Discovery
alone is not generally considered a valid basis for a perfect title."). Discovery in addition to
"intent to occupy eventually" is also an inadequate basis for a legal claim. F. AUBURN, supra

note 10, at 6 (emphasis added) (citing R.

JENNINGS, THE AQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1963)). See also Island of Palmas Case, (United States v. Netherlands),

2 UNRIAA 829, 846 (1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928).
Alexander opines, however, that "[a]t a minimum, discovery must be followed by or combined
with symbolic acts designed to announce a claim of sovereignty. Alexander, supra note 6, at 391.
82. Joyner, supra note 7, at 707 n.90 (citing Law of Common Spaces, supra note 46, at
816-18).
83. F. AUBURN, supranote 10, at 8 (citing F. RONNE, ANTARCTIC COMMAND 31 (1961)).
84. See F. AUBURN, THE Ross DEPENDENCY 17 (1972); G. DUFEK, OPERATION DEEPFREEZE

137 (1957).
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Claims based on discovery encounter even more difficulty and complexity when multinational expeditions are involved. For example, five
nations were represented on the Belgica expedition. No one really
knows which nation has the superior right to claim a region discovered
during the expedition. However, today, seven nations, including the
United States and the Soviet Union, use discovery as one "source of
title" or potential title and nothing more.8.

Symbolic Act

Symbolic acts are unique, creative manifestations of a nation's claim
to territorial sovereignty. The acts are performed upon discovery of
a region, and they serve as notice to the world that the claimant
nation intends to exercise sovereign rights thereafter.- During an
Australian expedition lasting from 1929 to 1931, explorers symbolized
claims by (1) planting their nation's flag in the frozen ground; (2) orally
proclaiming territorial annexation; (3) attaching several copies of the
proclamation to the flagstaff; and (4) recording the act.87 In 1939,
Australian explorer Lincoln Ellsworth dropped claims notices from his
airplane during flights over the American Highlands.- Even the Nazis
expressed interest in Antarctic sovereignty by dropping swastikas
from airplanes. s9 Mere flights over an area of the continent sufficed
to legitimize Riiser Larsen's claim for Norway.9
The United States has also utilized the theory of symbolic act to
support potential Antarctic claims. For example, the United States
Navy erected bronze pipes and buried brass plates in 1948. Eight
years earlier, the State Department prepared "claim sheets" for burial
in continental "rock beacons."9l

85. "Only two [countries], . . . Norway and Australia, can point to a [specific] period approximately twenty-five years - which is arguably reasonable." F. AUBURN, supra note 10,
at 9. See also Joyner, supra note 7, at 707 n. 90 (citing Tauberfeld, A Treaty for Antarctica

in

INT'L CONCILIATION

246, 251 (1960-1961)).

The symbolism theory is "discovery coupled with a manifestation of intent to claim."
F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 11.
87. See A. PRICE, THE WINNING OF AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTICA, Mawson's Banzara Voyages 1929-1931, 22 (1962).
88. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 9. Specifically, Ellsworth claimed 'the area 150 miles
east, west and south of his line of flight" by dropping a copper tube containing, in part, these
words of notice: "which I claim to have explored . .. so far as this act allows." F. AUBURN,
supra note 84, at 19 (citing Ellsworth, My Four Antarctic Expeditions, 76(I) NAT'L GEO86.

GRAPHIC MAG.

129, 137 (1937)).

89. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 39.
90. F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 19.
91. Id. For a detailed discussion of the United States' use of claims markers in Antarctica,
see generally D. SHAPLEY, supra note 18, at 20-64 (includes maps).
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Other symbolic acts used to substantiate claims have included issuance of commemorative postage stamps and the mere utterance of
a region in a novel.- Symbolic acts continue to be an internationally
popular practice. Not too long ago, the world watched as two American
astronauts set foot on the moon and erected a staffed American flag
as evidence of their visit. 93
9.

Subjugation

Sovereignty by subjugation, or by force, has obviously dismal
ramifications. When diplomacy fails, war seems to be the only means
to unquestionable establishment of sovereignty, as was the case in
the Falkland Islands dispute. 94 Necessary elements of successful subjugation include conquest (i.e., surrender by one nation to another,
followed by annexation of the disputed territory). 95
However, the United Nations declared subjugation unlawful in the
Covenant of the League of Nations.96 Regrettably, though not surprisingly, recent international incidents demonstrate the resolution's lack
of efficacy. Some of these incidents include the Falkland Islands dispute and the Palestinian-Israeli dispute involving the Gaza Strip and
West Bank.
92. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 39-41 (discussing postal symbolism); id. at 9-10 (discussing
use of literary symbolism including use by the United States and Great Britain). See also F.
AUBURN, supra note 84, at 8, 17-19 & 54; A. KELLER, 0. LISSITZYN & F. MANN, CREATION
OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC ACTS, 1400-1800 (1938).
93. Men Land on Moon, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1969, at Al, col. 1. This historic event took
place on July 20, 1969. THE AMERICAN DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA 83, 1106 (Rosenbaum ed. 1984).
A plaque was also left behind. It read:
HERE MEN FROM THE PLANET EARTH
FIRST SET FOOT UPON THE MOON

JULY 1969,

A. D.

WE CAME IN PEACE FOR ALL MANKIND

The plaque also contained the names of President Nixon and the astronauts on the mission. See
Science Service: Man in Space 55 (1969).
94. Many talks between Argentina and the United Kingdom were held in an attempt to
peacefully resolve the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands. See generally R. PERL,
supra note 56, at 83-84.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. (citing 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
See also D. ZAFREN, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) SITUATION: SOME INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES (1982) (published by Congressional Research Serv., Library of Congress).
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IV.

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR, ANTARCTIC
THE INTERNATIONAL
TREATY REGIME, AND IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES

As discussed, territorial claims of sovereignty can be based on one
or more of a variety of rationales. Nations including Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom
have exhausted the rationales and have staked their claims, many of
which overlap. Other nations including Belgium, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Japan, Poland, and South Africa have yet to stake claims
and refuse to recognize the claims of the other nations. The Soviet
Union and the United States also do not recognize sovereign rights
of the claimant nations in Antarctica. Nevertheless, they have reserved
the right to stake their own claims in the future.- The dilemma is
seemingly without resolve.
After World War II, various nations, including the United States,
proposed subjecting Antarctica to the control of the international community in attempts to alleviate political unrest. However, these proposals failed to win adequate support. 98 Subsequent events, such as the
International Geophysical Year (I.G.Y.) and ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, successfully ended fears 99that conflict among interested
nations would result in a "cold war.

97.

See W.

WESTERMEYER,

supra note 7, at 29 (bales 2-1 & 2-2); see also Hayton, Polar

Problems and International Law, 52 AM. J. INTL L. 746, 762-63 (1958) (examining U.S.

intentions to reserve right to stake claim in future) [hereinafter Hayton, PolarProblems]; Toma,
Soviet Attitude Toward the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic, 50 Am.J.
INT'L L. 611 (1956) (re Russian intent).
Interestingly, a 1973 document sponsored by a (U.S.) Congressional subcommittee cites the
United States as an unofficial claimant nation re Antarctica. See Qasim & Rajan, The Antarctic
Treaty System from the Perspective of a New Member, in Beeby, supra note 5, at 370 (citing
Bullis, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security & Sci. Dev., at 56 (Nov. 1973)).
98. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
99. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 353 (1960) ("There
was genuine concern that the most dangerous inter-nation rivalry of all time, the "Cold War,"
might be extended to the South Pole.").
See Vicuna, Antarctic Conflict and International Cooperation, in Beeby, supra note 5, at

61 ("Antarctic Treaty has made the difference between a continent of rivalry and conflict and
one of peace and cooperation.") [hereinafter Vicuna]; Beeby, supra note 5, at 270 ("the major
achievement of the treaty was to put a lid on the large potential for tension, rivalry, dispute
and even conflict that was inherent in the preexisting situation"); Baldwin, The Dependence of
Science on Law and Government -

The International Geophysical Year - A Case Study, 1964

Wis. L. REv. 78. See also infra note 101.
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The InternationalGeophysical Year

From July 1957 to December 1958, the International Council of
Scientific Unions organized the I.G.Y.' ° Basically, the purpose of the
I.G.Y. was to promote international scientific cooperation in the Antarctic region and to temporarily alleviate political unrest. 1 1 By the
end of the first year of the I.G.Y., twelve nations had opened over
sixty scientific research stations in Antarctica without restricting location.10 Participants made a "gentlemen's agreement" that territorial
claims could not prevent a nation from moving in and setting up
"scientific shop," nor could a subsequent claim be based on activities
01 3
conducted during the I.G.Y.
More than five thousand international representatives participated
in research programs of "unprecedented scope."1 ° The United States,
for example, sponsored participation of over three thousand representatives who ultimately gathered twenty-seven tons of data. This data
was shipped home on twelve naval ships. 01' 5
B.

The Antarctic Treaty

December 1984 marked 25 years since the signing of one of
the most significant international documents of our time the Antarctic Treaty.
- Yuri M. Rybakov'0

100. Bilder, Control of Criminal Conduct in Antarctica, 52 VA. L. REV. 231, 234 (1964).
For detailed discussions on the I.G.Y., see sources cited in Id. at 234 n.6; H. BULLIS, THE
POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR (1973); W. SULLIVAN,
ASSAULT ON THE UNKNOWN (1961).
101.

J. MYHRE,

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY

31 (1986) (A particularly volatile situation occurred in 1956 when Russia established its first
base (Mirny) in Australia's claimed sector.). See infra note 107.
Cf. Hatherton, supra note 32, at 29 ("Easement of potential 'international discord' had been
quietly sought in diplomatic circles for more than a decade before 1959.").
102. See Criminal Conduct in Antarctica, supra note 100, at 234.
103. See W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 15.
104. See Bilder, supra note 100, at 234; Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 14.
Cosmic rays, meteorology, and the upper atmosphere were some of the subjects studied
during the I.G.Y. Joyner & Theis, supra note 17, at 71. For a detailed discussion of more
recent scientific activity in Antarctica, see generally the articles published in Beeby, supra note
5, at 85-191.
105. Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 14.
106. Rybakov, JuridicalNature of the 1959 Treaty System, in Beeby, supranote 5, at 33.
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The success of the I.G.Y. prompted the United States to propose
on May 2, 1958, a continuation of international scientific effort in
Antarctica. This proposal would be ratified by a treaty "designed to
preserve the continent as an international laboratory for scientific
research and ensure that it be used only for peaceful purposes.' 1 °7 In
effect, on December 1, 1959, twelve nations including the seven claimant nations, Belgium, Japan, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and the
United States, negotiated and ratified the Treaty. The effective date
of this treaty was June 23, 1961.108
The negotiations preceding the ratification of the Treaty were not
without debate and compromise. For example, New Zealand and Great
Britain were the only nations willing to relinquish their Antarctic
claims in favor of an international regime, while most other claimants
were steadfastly opposed to any such condition.' 19 Finally, the treaty
was completed when all nations allowed the seven concerned nations
to retain their claims in Antarctica. However, pursuant to a provision,
any new or enlarged claims are banned. 110
The Treaty is binding on all consultative parties. 1 I Acceding nations
which have yet to gain consultative party status are Bulgaria, China,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Papau New Guinea, Peru,
Romania, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Uraguay.112 Any govern-

107.

HOUSE SUBCOMM.

ON

NAT'L SECURITY

POL'Y

LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

& Sci. DEV., THE POLITICAL

57 (Comm. Print 1973). According to

one commentator, the United States' proposal was, in actuality, motivated in part by Russian
intention to "maintain its bases in Antarctica." D. SHAPLEY, supra note 18, at 89-90. See W.
WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 15.
108. See generally W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 15 19. Beginning in June, 1958,
representatives of 12 interested nations met bi-weekly at the National Academy of Sciences in
Washington, D.C., to delineate what became the Antarctic Treaty. A "self-imposed deadline of
December 31, 1958," for completion of the Treaty was missed by less than a year. D. SHAPLEY,
supra note 18, at 90.
109. Peterson, Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush on Earth, 34 INT'L ORG. 377, 379,
379 n.6 (1980).
110. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, at art. IV reprintedinfraAppendix I. For a discussion
concerning Article IV and its use as a "conflict resolution mechanism," see generally Watts,
The Antarctic Treaty as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism, in Beeby, supra note 5, at 65-75.
111. See supra note 10 for a list of nations which have attained consultative party status
since the ratification of the Treaty.
112. W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 29; Triggs, supra note 10, at 195; U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1986, at 211 (1986); Sullivan,
Meeting Near Pole to Take Up Antarctica's Future, The New York Times, Dec. 30, 1984, at
12A, col. 3.
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ment which is a member of the United Nations may accede to the
Treaty.113 In order for a nation to qualify for consultative party status
and thus have a right to participate in future decision-making, "substantial" scientific activity has to be exhibited (i.e., via research expeditions or research station establishment in the region).114
In the twenty-six years since the Treaty's enforcement, major
achievements have been documented:
(1) Use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only, prohibition
of nuclear explosion or waste, and limited military presence
(presence for the purpose of logistical support of scientific
research only);"1 5
(2) Promotion of international cooperation regarding freedom
of scientific research;116
(3) International exchange of scientific personnel and infor17
mation about scientific programs and data;
(4) Conservation and preservation of living resources;"
(5) Periodic meetings between the consultative parties for
the purpose of insuring that the Treaty objectives are furthered and accomplished;" 9
(6) Beneficial expansion of the Treaty's scope; 120
(7) Recognition and appreciation for the value of international
harmony, scientific cooperation, and the inherent wealth and
timidity of the Antarctic environment.12,

113. A nation not a member of the U.N. may accede to the Treaty by invitation by all
consultative parties. Antarctic Treaty, supranote*10, at art. XIII reprinted infraAppendix I.
Discussion of the entire Treaty provisions is beyond the scope of this article. For further
discussion regarding other provisions, see generally W. WESTERMEYER, supranote 7, at 15-24;
The International Legal Regime for Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INTL L.J. 155 (1986); Triggs,
supra note 10.
114. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, at art. IX, reprinted infra Appendix I.
115. For example, a small reactor used to power the United States' research station
(McMurdo) had to be removed because it produced a small amount of low-level radioactive waste
material in violation of the Treaty. See W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 50 n.19; Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 10, at arts. I & V reprinted infra Appendix I.
116. Pursuant to Treaty provisions, scientists may travel freely in Antarctica and conduct
scientific research. See Antarctic Treaty, supranote 10, at art. II reprinted infra Appendix I.
117. See id. at arts. III & VII. Article VII of the Treaty specifically provides for freedom
of inspection of research stations and installations in the Antarctic region and requires advance
notice of planned expeditions.
118. Id. at art. IX.
119. Id.; see supra note 10 (discussing meetings and objectives).
120. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
121. Roberts, InternationalCo-Operationfor Antarctic Development: The Test for the Antarctic Treaty, 19 POLAR RECORD 107, 108 (1978).
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Notwithstanding these and other achievements, criticism and cynicism
exist on the other end of the spectrum. One commentator concedes
"that this semipermanent conference . . . has been [only] moderately
successful in giving effect to the principles and objectives of the
Treaty."'= Another commentator explains that the "Treaty is not perfect [because] it was designed more as a mechanism to sidestep
[politico-legal] problems than as a way to resolve them."'1
Pursuant to Article XII of the Treaty, the Treaty's fate may be
called into question in 1991. At that time, a consultative party may
call to order a meeting of all other parties "to review the operation"
of the Treaty. A majority of Treaty members must propose a change
in the Treaty; however, unanimous approval is required to effectuate
the proposal.- Therefore, instability of the Treaty could lead to its
demise in 1991.1V.

RESURRECTION OF POLITICAL UNREST

Alleviation of political unrest due particularly to conflicting claims
of Antarctic sovereignty was a prime motivating factor leading to the
conception of the Treaty. In 1959 issues regarding resource exploration
and exploitation were not major concerns of the twelve contracting
nations. In recent years, this lack of concern was described as a root
cause of a supposed weakening of the value and effectiveness of the
Treaty. Indeed, countless articles were written alleging instability of
a deficient Treaty. 126 Serious speculation of vast mineral wealth in
Antarctica presents invaluable opportunity to a world which has faced
dwindling reserves of fuel and other mineral resources. 12' Moreover,

122. Triggs, supra note 10, at 196.
123. W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 46.
124. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, at art. XII reprinted infra Appendix I.
125. For example, Deborah Shapley, a journalist and scholar at Georgetown University's
Center for Strategic and International Studies, predicts that "if a strong movement exists among
the treaty powers for changing the treaty in 1991, or if there is discord in the group at that
time, there could be substantial change in the status quo." D. SHAPLEY, supra note 18, at 205.
126.

See, e.g., Triggs, supra note 10, at 197 ("The [R]egime remains . . . a weak and

shadowy structure . ..justifiably criticized as less effective than it should be."); Taubenfeld,
supra note 85, at 295 ("[The Regime is] a weakly organized program [which] may in the long
run be insufficient to the task."); Bilder, supra note 15, at 167 ("Mineral resource exploration
and exploitation in Antarctica could challenge the stability of the present Antarctic legal and
political [R]egime.").
127. In recent years, however, sluggish growth in developed nations and energy conservation have significantly reduced world demand for oil and other resources. Francioni, Legal
Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163, 164 n.6 (1986).
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with increased shortages of food for a global population that grows
by 200,000 each day, an abundance of protein-rich krill in the Antarctic
seas provides an important and timely source of hunger relief.,as
A.

A World Attraction: Antarctica's Natural Resources
1. Minerals

In 1973, explorers discovered pockets of natural gas in the continental shelf in the western Antarctic region, leading the United States
Geological Survey to speculate that 115 trillion cubic feet of the resource may be recoverable.129 Moreover, a vast wealth of crude oil "possibly tens of billions of barrels" - exist beneath the ice mantle.13°
In addition, Antarctica allegedly contains the "world's largest coalfield." Some of the coal is of the type used to make steel, but most
is probably impure with "high ash content. ' 13 1 Also Soviet explorers
discovered massive amounts of iron ore. American scientists believe
an area of the continent is geologically ripe with significant deposits
of platinum, nickel, copper, lead, zinc, vanadium, cobalt, tin, and
gold. 132 A more recent estimate holds that over 900 mineral-rich deposits exist under the continent's landmass.-33 Finally, Soviet scientists
claim that uranium exists in the seabed of the Antarctic region and
will soon be extractable.-

128. About the time the Treaty was negotiated, the world population totaled 3 billion. In
1987, the population increased to 5 billion and is expected to double during the next century.
See Global Population Growing by More Than 200,000 a Day, Hamal, The Arrival of the
5-Billionth Human, The Futurist, July-Aug., 1987, at 36-37; see also Bilder, supra note 15, at
167.
129. Specifically, natural gas was discovered beneath the Ross Sea. Wassermann, The
Antarctic Treaty and Natural Resources, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 174, 176 (1978); Zumberge,
Mineral Resources and Geopolitics in Antarctica, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 67, 73-74 (Jan.-Feb.
1979)(citing a Wall Street Journal report).
130. Wassermann, supra note 129, at 176. Russia's Institute for Arctic Geology in 1974
opined that Antarctic oil resources surpass Alaska's. Id.
131. Id. at 177. Anthracite is used in steel-making. All coal deposits - concentrated mostly
in eastern Antarctica - are "highly inaccessible." Id.
132. More specifically, the area is similar geologically to other areas of the world which
yield such minerals. Id.
133. W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 36 ("more than 900 major mineral deposits").
But "[tihe deposits discussed here are.. . primarily speculative and hypothetical although some
conditional resources have been located." Id. at 53 n.52. For a detailed discussion concerning
mineral resources in the Antarctic region, see generally Zumberge, supra note 129, at 71-74;
Pinto, The InternationalCommunity and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 478 (1978).
134. Wassermann, supra note 129, at 177.
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2.

Marine Life

Krill, shrimp-like planktonic crustaceans, are the most abundant
of accessible resources in the Antarctic region.- An available 110-150
16
million tons of krill could triple the world's annual marine catch. 3
Other living resources attracting international attention include (1)
Antarctic cod and icefish found at the surface near icebergs; (2) squid,
crabs, and lobsters found near subAntarctic islands; and (3) whales
and seals. 137
3.

Freshwater

Finally, one important resource found in Antarctica could help
alleviate increasing shortages in global freshwater supplies. Scientists
estimate that as much as ninety percent of the world's freshwater is
in Antarctica in the forms of snow and ice. 13 Saudi Arabia provided
the information which led to research on the feasibility of towing
half-mile long icebergs to drought-stricken areas of the world; the
melting icebergs would create small ponds which could be used for

135. "Krill" is actually a Norwegian term which means "whale food." Id.
136. Suggestions for krill catch quotas reflect the "ecosystem approach" - an approach
which considers "catch levels in terms of their effects at all points in the food chain." Mitchell
& Tinker, supra note 18, at 35-45. Not surprisingly, the suggestions for quotas have varied.
Because krill are centrally located in the Antarctic food chain, a safe quota determination is
critical. El-Sayed & McWhinnie, Antarctic Krill: Protein of the Last Frontier, in Harvesting
the Sea, 22(1) OCEANUS 13 (1979).
137. For about half a century, whaling was primarily conducted in Antarctic water until
diminishing herds led to its regulation in 1932 by the International Whaling Commission. Russia
and Japan are the only two nations which continue to whale in the region, and only one species
of whale, the small minke, is "abundant enough to catch." See generally Hatherton, supra note
32, at 28-29; Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 46-48. But see Japan hits minke limit, The
State, Mar. 15, 1987, at 1-A, col. 1 ("Japanese crews . . . killed their 1,941st minke whale of
the year in the Antarctic, filling their quota for the season and marking the beginning of the
end of Japan's whaling industry.").
Sealing, too, is an industry at a near standstill in Antarctica. With most species of seal
nearly extinct in the region by the 1830's, sealing was off and on through the next century until
1972 when a regulation was initiated for the purpose of controlling the seal population. The
regulation was the result of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978) [hereinafter Conservation of Antarctic Seals]. Since then, the population has steadily increased to nearly a half
million; compare this figure with only 100 in 1930. Hatherton, supra note 32, at 19-23; Mitchell
& Tinker, supra note 18, at 4849.
138.

SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION, HOUSE

COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

POTENTIAL

94th

CONG.,

2d SESS.,

POLAR ENERGY RESOURCES

3 (Comm. Print 1976).
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drinking and irrigation.139 A recent news item reported a "big iceberg
on the loose" in the Ross Sea after breaking from an Antarctic ice
shelf. 140 Guy G. Guthridge of the National Science Foundation stated
that, "[i]f you could somehow transport it to California and melt it,
it would supply all the water needs of Los Angeles for the next 675

years! "141
B.

Politics of Resource Exploration and Exploitation

As of 1985, the consultative parties have convened over twenty
times, 142 producing policy discussions and binding recommendations
and consequently, expanding the Treaty's scope.- 4 Discussions and
recommendations have concerned such uncontroversial topics as increased tourism, telecommunications, transportation, exchanges of scientific data and information of expedition plans, and administration of
the advancement of scientific research.144
The meetings have also resulted in the promulgation of agreed
upon measures and conventions on environmental conservation which
are binding on the consultative parties. The Agreed Measures for the
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, negotiated in 1964, provides for the regulation and protection of native wildlife. 1 5 Since 1972,
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals regulates sealing.146 Since 1980, krill and other marine life are generally regulated
through the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Liv-

139. Lundquist, The Iceberg Cometh?: InternationalLaw Relating to Antarctic Iceberg
Exploitation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1977); IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, ICEBERG UTILIZATION (1978) (proceedings of the First International Conference &
Workshop on Iceberg Utilization for Freshwater Production, Water Modification & Other Applications, held at Iowa State University, in Ames, Iowa, on Oct. 2-6, 1977) (on file with author);
Schmid, Taking iceberg to desert not just dry humor, The Providence Sunday J., Jan. 29, 1979,
at C-8, col. 1.
140. Big iceberg on the loose, Miami Herald, Nov. 8, 1987, at 9A, col. 1 (iceberg twice the
size of Rhode Island).
141. Id.
142. See Francioni, supra note 127, at 164 n.7; Question of Antarctica: Study Requested
Under General Assembly Resolution 38/77, Report of the secretary-general, Pt. I (Agenda Item
66) at 31, U.N. Doc. A139/583 pt. I (1984) [hereinafter Question of Antarctica].
143. See Triggs, supra note 10, at 210 ("Consultative Parties which have approved recommendations will clearly be bound by them.").
144. See generally W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7; Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18.
145. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13, 1964,
17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692.
146. Conservation of Antarctic Seals, supra note 137.
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ing Resources. 147 Presently, negotiations concerning a minerals regime
are underway via a separate convention.14 However, as Gillian Triggs,
Law Professor at the University of Melbourne, concedes that "[t]he
regime remains ... a weak and shadowy structure given to horatory
recommendations [agreements and conventions] rather than clear [and
''
legal] enforcement mechanisms. 149
The recent French airstrip controversy is a poignant example. In
1983, when the French government commenced construction of an
aircraft runway in Pointe Geologie, a region situated in its claimed
sector, 15° the French government seemed to disregard totally the detrimental impact the project would have on the delicate Antarctic environment. For example, during the initial stages of construction,
Emperor penguins, a rare species of penguin, were slaughtered, and
eggs were destroyed by dynamite explosions. Other birds were forcefully uprooted from their nesting sites. Not only were these actions
violative of the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic
Fauna and Flora, they were seemingly of little or no concern to the
consultative parties. Such benign neglect deservedly attracted harsh
criticism: "[t]he handling of this case raises a question of credibility
for the Antarctic Treaty System. If member governments fail to take
any collective action - even to investigate allegations of breach the public can have little confidence in the commitments of governments pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty and related instruments. 1151
An unfortunante incident such as this increases the chances of
ending the Treaty. However, as technological advancement slowly
increases in the area of resource discovery and recovery in Antarctica,
international interest in the legal and practical status of the Treaty
grows. Some nations support continued maintenance of the Treaty.

147. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for
signature May 20, 1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982).
148. For further discussion on the subject, see generally Francioni, supra note 127, at
164-66 (providing cites of additional sources). See also Charney, Future Strategiesfor an Antarctic Mineral Resource Regime - Can the Environment be Protected?, in THE NEW NATIONALISM
AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 206, 230 (Charney ed. 1982) ("[Ilt appears that the Antarctic
Treaty states are moving toward the negotiation of a comprehensive mineral resource regime.").
149. Triggs, supra note 10, at 197.
150. The following brief account (in text) of the airstrip affair is entirely based on the
discussion found in Joyner, supra note 16, at 268-70.
151. Id. at 270 (quoting Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), Background Paper
on the French Airfield at Pointe Geologie, Antarctica, at 8 (Mar. 1, 1985) (mimeographed)).
Construction has supposedly ceased, although several environmental groups (i.e., Greenpeace)
report this is not the case. Id. at 269.
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Other nations, particularly of the Third World, persistently argue that
the Treaty is an obsolete tool of a selfish "Antarctic club,"'152 and should
be replaced with a more internationally altruistic one. 163
C.

Alternative Antarctic Regimes

[A]ny delay in taking immediate action toward a new, internationally acknowledged legal ordering of Antarctica will
only make resolution of the .
. resource problem more
difficult to achieve.
Frank C. Alexander, Jr. 15
-

One proposed alternative regime in Antarctica is a territorialregime. This regime would allow the claimant nations to retain their
"pie slices" and sub-Antarctic islands in addition to rights to a territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone.,' The obvious economic advantages associated with this regime would be enjoyed by nations which
have established claims, and possibly by nations like the United States
and the Soviet Union which have reserved their right to stake future

claims. 156
In an open use regime, no nation would own Antarctica (res nullius). Unlike the present Treaty, all nations would have access to the
region for purposes of resource exploration and exploitation. 157
Theoretically, an open use regime would be the "least restrictive regime" and, basically, could result in an international "free-for-all."158
However, implementation of this regime without environmental protection regulation could devastate the delicate Antarctic ecosystem. 159

152. F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 147; Barcel6, The International Legal Regime for
Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155 (1986); Triggs, supra note 10, at 204; Skegestad, The
Frozen Frontier:Models for InternationalCo-operation, 10 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 168
(1975); Note, supra note 46, at 806.
153. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
154. Alexander, supra note 6, at 402.
155. See W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 59. "Most lawyers ... accept the rule that
ice shelves and sheet ice . . . will be treated as 'land' while the seasonally varying pack ice
floating on water and icebergs . . . will be treated as 'water' for legal purposes." Peterson,
supra note 109, at 393 n.66.
156. One advantage is increased confidence in business investment in an area of the world
where property rights are undisputed. See generally W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 59-60.
157. See generally id. at 63-67.
158. Id. at 64.
159. For a detailed discussion on an open use regime as an alternative to the Treaty Regime,
see generally id. at 63-67; Burton, supra note 19, at 462-72.
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Territory owned or managed by two or more nations is referred
to as a condominium regime.- 6 This regime could help alleviate the
problems associated with overlapping claims to territory. For example,
Argentina, Chile, and Britain would share ownership of their conflicting Antarctic claims instead of arguing over them. Resource exploration and exploitation would be joint ventures by the "sharing" nations,
as the proceeds of which would likewise be shared.61A condominium regime is a realistic and workable option. For
example, France and Spain share ownership of the Isle of Faisans.
Britain, Germany, and the United States co-owned Samoa from 1878
to 1899. Since 1939, Britain and the United States have co-owned
Enderberry and Canton.6 2 Co-ownership of the New Hebrides by
France and Britain from 1906 to 1980, on the other hand, has been
assessed as an "administrative nightmare."'- Notably, the idea of a
condominium regime in Antarctica was once proposed by the United
States in 1948, but was subsequently rejected by the claimant nations.164 As one critic of this regime comments "an exclusive condominium scheme in Antarctica would shock the conscience of the
world community."'The Antarctic Treaty members under a consortium regime would
"exercise joint and exclusive control over [regional] resources" without
relinquishing their conflicting claims. - These nations would divide the

160. W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 71-75; G. HACKWORTH, 1 DIG. OF INT'L LAW
56 (1940); Peterson, supra note 109, at 395; Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdictionand the Law
of the Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 45, 65-66 n.105 (1985).
161. Alexander, supra note 6, at 414-15. Cf. Agreement Between the United States of
America and Brazil Concerning Shrimp, Mar. 14, 1975, United States-Brazil, 27 U.S.T. 1377,
T.I.A.S. No. 8253 (jointly managed fisheries regime); see also Skegestad, supra note 152, at 168.
162. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 78-79 (3d ed. 1979); Peterson, supra note
109, at 596; see also W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 71-75 (discussing existing condominium
regimes and the associated advantages).
163. Rich, A Minerals Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 709, 717 (1982). If
co-ownership of the Hebrides by only two nations was a "nightmare," then "an eightfold increase
in the number of condominium members would create even greater administrative difficulties."
See Note, supra note 160, at 66 n.105; see also W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 71 (citing
C. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 12 (1959) ("[A] condominium [in Antarctica] has never been utilized because it was considered
to be desirable per se, but rather faute de mieux because the states involved were unable to
settle a disagreement in any more definitive way.")).
164. Schatz, A Sea of Sensitivity, in The Southern Ocean, 18(4) OCEANUS 50, 52 (1975)
("U.S. proposal ... failed to win acceptance").
165. Note, supra note 46, at 843.
166. W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 78-79; C. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFIELD, supra
note 163, at 188; Peterson, supra note 109, at 397-98.
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proceeds of resource exploitation in accordance with the amount of
financial and technological contribution each provides. For example,
if the United States finances fifty percent of the cost necessary to
mine iron ore beneath the continent, then the United States would
receive fifty percent of the proceeds. 167 The less powerful and
technologically deficient member nations would probably find this arrangement for resource sharing unsatisfactory. In addition, the more
powerful and technologically advanced members would probably "have
serious reservations about [mandatory] sharing of their technology
with others."' 68Basically, the advantages and problems associated with
this regime are not unique from those in a condominium regime.
The regime most commonly posited as the appropriate alternative
concerns the "common heritage of mankind" concept (res communes).169
This concept has been a recurrent theme in other international accords,
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, yet
to be officially ratified,170 the Moon Treaty, 1 1 the Outer Space Treaty, 172

167. See generally id.
168. W. WESTERMEYER, supra note 7, at 79. "One way around this shortcoming would
be to assign different exploitation functions to different countries." Id. (citing Interview with
Joe Richardson, U.S. Dep't of State, Dec., 1981). For further discussion of the notion of technology transfer pursuant to international law, see infra note 207 and accompanying text.
169. See F. AUBURN, supra note 10, at 293; Triggs, supra note 10, at 216 n.127 (providing
numerous supportive cities). See also infra note 180 (additional supportive cites). For a detailed
discussion of the common heritage of mankind concept, see Larschan & Brennan, The Common
Heritageof Mankind Principlein InternationalLaw, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983).
But see Trumpy, Resource Sharing: Penury or Development of the InternationalResponse, in
Natural Resources in International Law, 54/55/56 YEARBOOK OF THE A. OF ATENDERS &
ALUMNI OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT'L

L. 184, 190 (1984/85/86).

170. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signatureDec. 10, 1982,
art. 136, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Convention].
See also Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh
Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979). See infra note 207 (information regarding the
United States' refusal to sign the Convention).
171. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/34/664, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434
(1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984). See also P. QUIGG, supra note 46, at 174-78. The Moon
Treaty dictates that "neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon shall become the
property of any country." Tinker & Mitchell, supra note 18, at 74. Thus, any resources and
information gathered from moon exploration must be shared with the international community.
Id.
172. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. See also P. QuIGG, supra note 46, at 174-78. The U.N.
Committee on Outer Space in 1979 "approved a treaty proclaiming the natural resources of the
moon and other celestial bodies to be the 'common heritage of mankind."' Mitchell & Tinker,
supra note 18, at 74.
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and the Deep Seabed Declaration.73 One international law scholar
admits the legal ramifications of the concept are unclear. Nonetheless,
it seems to "create an obligation for individual states to use the resources of [an area] in a way that promotes not only national interests,
74
but the well-being of mankind as a whole."'
Establishing Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind would
presumably (1) quash present claims in the region; (2) preclude private
licensing and issuance of permits for exploration and exploitation; (3)
create international sovereignty over, and access to, the region; and
(4) insure international rights to the benefits derived thereof. 175 Basically, Antarctic property rights would be vested in everyone for the
purposes and good of everyone. 76
Professor Triggs is critical of the common heritage concept which
he describes as "notoriously slippery and ill-defined.' ' 177 Christopher
D. Beeby, of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes "[i]t
is neither reasonable nor realistic to suppose that the . . . concept

173. See Burton, supra note 19, at 464-66 n.184.
174. Francioni, supra note 127, at 171.
175. Id. at 173-74; Note, supra note 160, at 66 n.106 (summarizing concept of "heritage of
mankind" regime); Note, supra note 46, at 808-11 (explaining historical justification for "common
heritage of mankind" regime in Antarctica); Note, Draft Provisions of a New International
Convention on Antarctica, 4 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 123 (1977) (proposing a model
for administration of Antarctica pursuant to "heritage of mankind" regime).
176. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of res communes).
One interesting argument holds that the present Treaty Regime actually "internationalizes"
Antarctica. Felipe Macedo de Soares Guimaraes, of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations,
explains that Article IV of the Treaty "preserves the opportunity for all countries... to express
an interest in the whole of Antarctica, not just a slice of it." Moreover, Article IV prohibits
nationalization of the region. Thus, any proposal to convert the region into a res communes is
"in effect" a proposal to ultrainternationalize (the region). See Beeby, supra note 5, at 280
(remarks by Felipe Macedo de Soares Guimaraes during panel discussion concerning legal and
political background of the Treaty).
177. Triggs, supra note 10, at 218-19 (describes five objectives of the "common heritage"
theme).
Malta Ambassador Arvid Pardo provides a definition:
First of all there is the "absence of property." The common heritage engenders
the right to use certain property, but not to own it. It implies the management
of property and the obligation of the international community to transmit the
common heritage, including resources and values, in historical terms. Common
heritage implies management. Management not in the narrow sense of management
of resources, but management of all uses. Third, common heritage implies sharing
of benefits.
See Note, The PolarRegions and the Law of the Sea, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 204, 215-16
(1976).
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can make headway with respect to Antarctica."17 And not surprisingly,
the Treaty members have "rebuffed" the idea to revise the Treaty.
Notwithstanding vehement dissent by Treaty adherents and noted
scholars, a significant portion of the international community seems
dedicated to the notion of spreading the wealth of the frozen region
and making it another "common heritage of mankind." ' s For example,
Sri Lanka emphasized "[t]here are still areas of this planet where
opportunities remain for constructive and peaceful cooperation . . .
for the common good of all rather than the benefit of a few" and that
"Is]uch an area is the Antarctic continent."ls In another speech, at a
seminar organized by Earthscan, 11 Sri Lanka warned member nations
that the Group of 771as "would not be satisfied if exclusive control by
the Antarctic Treaty powers were to continue. '" 8
Ironically, attempts to subject the Antarctic region to world-wide
control date back to 1948 when the United States proposed that the
area be placed under a United Nations trusteeship "with a permanent
secretariat and a ill legal personality.'
The twelve original contract178. Beeby, supra note 5, at 282.
179. Rybakov, supra note 106, at 45 ("USSR is resolutely opposed to any attempts aimed
at revising this important international treaty, no matter what pretexts are used to justify
them."); Rich, supra note 163, at 719 n.66; Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 74 ("Treaty
parties have so far successfully rebuffed all these initiatives"); Hayton, supra note 66, at 587
88; Note, supranote 160, at 66 n. 106 ("[C]laimant states vehemently reject the notion ...").
180. See, e.g., J. MYHRE, supra note 101, at 99: Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the
United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275 (1986); Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 73-74;
Note, supra note 160, at 66-67 n.106.
181. Furthermore, "Antarctica is an area where the now widely accepted ideas and concepts
relating to international economic cooperation with their special stress on the principle of equitable sharing of the world's resources, can find ample scope for application .... " Mitchell &
Tinker, supra note 18, at 73-74 (speech to U.N. General Assembly in 1975 by Sri Lanka
Ambassador, Shirley Amerasinghe).
182. Earthscan, an organization funded by the United Nations, provides the media with
information on global environmental issues of public concern.
183. The Group of 77 (Group) is a "coalition" of Third World nations - organized to provide
themselves a "more powerful voice in the U.N." Note, supranote 160, at 61-62 n.93; Alexander,
supra note 6, at 402 n.201. Approximately 112 developing nations are members of the Group.
Interestingly, two claimant nations - Argentina and Chile - are members. D. SHAPLEY,
supra note 18, at 149. One source indicates the Group formed in 1974. Id. Another source,
however, claims the Group formed in 1963. Note, supra note 160, at 61-62 n.93. Promotion of
the common heritage of mankind concept has been the Group's primary goal. D. SHAPLEY,
supra note 18, at 149-50, 222.
184. Triggs, supra note 10, at 217. See Mitchell & Tinker, supra note 18, at 1 ("[I]ncreasing
Third World pressure for Antarctic resources to be taken away from the treaty 'club' and placed
under international control - with a share-out of the benefits") (emphasis omitted).
185. Triggs, supra note 10, at 197; see also 19 DEPr ST. BULL. 301 (1948). The United
States alternatively proposed, without success, a condominium regime for Antarctica. F. AuBURN, supra note 10, at 85-86.
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ing parties to the Treaty rejected this attempt, like the earlier condominium proposal by the United States. Similar attempts made by
various nations in subsequent years did not materialize. 186 The status
quo as it exists today is persistenly threatened.

VI.

IMPEDIMENTS TO SURVIVAL OF THE TREATY REGIME

Certain events could lead to the downfall of the Antarctic Treaty.
These events include ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention
(Convention), development of an impracticable minerals regime, and
continuation of, and increase in world pressure to make Antarctica a
common heritage of mankind.
A.

Law of the Sea Convention versus Antarctic Treaty Regime
1. The Convention

The Convention has been vested with governmental authority over
the world's oceans. Ratification of the Convention, expected within
the decade,17 will establish, among other rights, (1) a twelve-mile
territorial sea, over which the coastal nation may exercise
sovereignty; 18 (2) an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200
miles seaward, where the coastal nation has exclusive rights to conserve, manage, explore, and exploit all resources found in the waters,
ocean floors and subsoils;189 and (3) a continental shelf boundary extending 200 miles seaward or, to the continental margin (whichever distance is greater), over which the coastal nation has jurisdiction to
explore and exploit resources. 19°
186. J. KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 76 (1973). Russia also made a similar
proposal via a 1950 memorandum. Toma, supra note 97, at 624-26 (reprint of memo). New
Zealand made a proposal in 1956. Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
436, 450-55 (1960). England followed suit in 1958. See Hayton, supra note 66, at 591. India
made proposals in 1956 and 1958 to the General Assembly of the U.N.. See U.N. Doc. A3118/
Add.1 (Sept. 13, 1956); U.N. Doc. A13852 (July 15, 1958); Hayton, PolarProblems, supra note
97, at 760.
187. Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A. J. 156, 156 (1983). Ratification by sixty
nations is necessary to bring the Convention into force. See Convention, supra note 170, art.
308. Nearly half the requisite number have ratified the Convention. Telephone interview with
Anne Reichel, Office of U.N. Agreements, Legal Dept., Treaty Section (July 20, 1988).
188. Convention, supra note 170, art. 2 & 3; id. at arts. 58, 88, 141, 240 (area past territorial
sea exclusively for "peaceful purposes").
189. See generally id. at arts 55-77. See Oxman, Antarctica and the New Law of the Sea,
19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 211, 220 (1986) (summarizing rights of coastal nations in EEZ).

190. A Convention formula allows for jurisdiction over a continental shelf up to 450 miles
seaward. See Convention, supra note 170, arts. 76 & 77.
Pursuant to Convention provisions, coastal nations which exploit continental shelf non-living
resources seaward of a 200 mile zone must pay a nominal fee for the right. Developing nations
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The area beyond the national jurisdictional boundary is the common
heritage of mankind.' 9' It comprises the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil. 192 Resources would be commonly owned and shared by all. 193Pursuant to Convention principles, recovery of resources, primarily manganese nodules and hydrocarbons, 194 would be the responsibility of an
195
International Sea-Bed Authority.
The Convention preserves "high seas"',- freedoms enjoyed by all
nations in the EEZ and the area seaward of the EEZ. 92 These freedoms include navigation and anchoring, overflight, cable and pipeline
laying, and other "related" uses. 198 Exercise of high seas freedoms
carry obligations, including protection of the environment' 99 and
abstention from activities which may conflict with a coastal nation's
EEZ rights."
Although silent on the matter, the Convention should apply to
waters in the Antarctic region by implication. The consequence of this
logic will, arguably, be an intense conflict of regimes. Like coterminous
spheres in a Venn diagram, the scope of the Convention as applied
in Antarctic waters will clash with that of the Treaty.

which are major importers of the exploited resources are exempted from this duty. Collected
fees will be equitably distributed among the international community - preferably among Third
World nations. Id. at art. 82.
See generally Oxman, supra note 189, at 216-20, 234-35 (discussing rights over continental
shelf).
191. Convention, supra note 170, at art. 136; id. at art. 141 (to be used "exclusively for
peaceful purposes").
192. Id. at art. 1, para. 1(1).
193. Id. at art. 136.
194. Joyner & Lipperman, Conflicting Jurisdictionin the Southern Ocean: The Case of an
Antarctic Minerals Regime, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1986).
195. Convention, supra note 170, at arts. 133-91. The Authority has ultimate responsibility
for management, licensure, and inspection of exploration and exploitation of resources by private
entities. Article 137 provides, in part, that "[a]ll rights in the resources of the Area ... are
vested in mankind . . . on whose behalf the [Seabed] Authority shall act."
. The Enterprise is the Authority's own mining company - which would share exploration
and exploitation activities with private and other commercial companies. See generally id.
196. The Convention is without a "high seas" definition. Article 1 of the High Seas Convention of 1958 provides a definition: "all parts of the sea . . . not included in the territorial sea
and internal waters." Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
197. Id. at arts. 58, 86 & 87.
198. Id. at art. 58(1).
199. See generally id. at arts. 58(3), 192-96, 210, 211(2), 212, 216-17 & 222.
200. Id. at art. 58(2).
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2.

Coterminous Regimes

Admittedly, the actual scope of the Treaty regarding Antarctic
waters is far from clear. Article VI provides, in part, that the Treaty
applies to the "area south of sixty degrees South latitude."' ° The
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
expressly expanded the scope of Article VI. The expansion covers the
region seaward (North) of sixty degrees South latitude and roughly
within the "Antarctic convergence."'' Environmental protection of the
entire Southern Ocean was the articulated rationale for expanding the
Treaty's original boundary. °3 The area seaward from the Convergence
should, without question, be considered "high seas" or the common
heritage of mankind, to be controlled specifically by the Convention.204
The Convention conditions a coastal nation's claim to an EEZ on
unquestionable establishment of territorial sovereignty; no nation can
satisfy this mandate vis-A-vis Antarctica.-a Theoretically, however,
Treaty members could collectively exercise rights that an individual
coastal nation would have under the Convention.206 That is, Treaty

members would act not unlike "sharing" nations of a condominium
regime.m

The Treaty declares that its provisions will not "prejudice or in
any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State
under international law with regard to the high seas within that
area. '" If this provision is given a literal interpretation, then the
Convention should logically be applicable to the waters not only north
of the convergence but also applicable to waters south of the convergence up to the EEZ or continental shelf outer limit. Such applica-

201. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix I, infra, art. VI.
202. See Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra note
147, at art. 1 ("This Convention applies to the Antarctic Marine living resources of the area
south of 600 South latitude and the marine living resources of the area between that latitude
and the Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem."); id. art.
4 ("The Antarctic Convergence shall be deemed to be a line joining the following points along
parallels of latitude and meridians of the longitude: 50* S, 0°;500 S, 300 E; 450 S, 30' E; 45 ,
800 E; 550 S, 800 E; 550 S, 1500 E; 600 S, 1500 E; 600 S, 500 W; 500 S, 500 W; 500, 0*").
203. Joyner & Lipperman, supra note 194, at 9.
204. See Carroll, Of Icebergs, Oil Wells and Treaties: Hydrocarbon Exploitation Offshore
Antarctica, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 219 (1983) ("Logical consistency [requires recognition]
that the [common heritage] Area includes Antarctic waters.").
205. Joyner, supra note 7, at 724-25.
206. Oxman, supra note 189, at 223-24. "It would be appropriate to conclude that the
parties to the Antarctic Treaty collectively may exercise... coastal state rights." Id. at 232.
207. Id. at 223-24.
208. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, at art. VI reprinted infra Appendix I.
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tion could permit access to this area for activities including deep seabed
mining subject to the consultation rights of "coastal nations" as provided under the Convention. 209 Whether the Treaty members would
accept this arrangement is doubtful.
3.

Conflict of Interests

By February 8, 1985, nearly all the consultative members of the
Treaty signed the Convention.2 0 Such "overwhelming support for the
Convention . . . foreshadow[s] the undoing of the Antarctic Treaty
system."' 21 Support for the Convention by Treaty partisans could be
viewed as approval of the Convention's application and superseding
authority in Antarctic waters. Moreover, if a consultative party recognizes an EEZ in the Antarctic region, as permitted under the Convention, the Treaty prohibition against creation or expansion of claims to
territorial sovereignty would presumably be breached.
B.

Development of a Minerals Regime

Development of a minerals regime is progressing toward completion. However, numerous factors impede final acceptance of the re-

209. See generally Convention, supra note 170, arts. 87 & 141; see also id. at art. 143
(some environmental rights provided as well).
210. The Convention was signed by 118 nations and by the United Nations Council for
Namibia on December 10, 1982. Ibrahim, The PreparatoryCommission of the International
Sea-Bed Authority and the Future Exploitation of Sea-Bed Resources, in Natural Resources
in InternationalLaw, in Yearbook, supra note 169, at 54. Four Treaty members - including
the United States - did not sign. The United States, nonetheless, attended the signing ceremony. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/514, at 2 (Dec. 10, 1982).
Reasons for the United States' refusal to sign include a Convention provision for mandatory
sharing of technological and scientific knowledge (re deep seabed mining) with the Enterprise
in return for reasonable compensation. See Convention, supra note 170, at art. 5(3)(a); Annex
III. For further information regarding reasons why the United States refused to sign, see
Malone, Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy, DEPT ST. BULL., Oct., 1982, at 48-49; NATIONAL
FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: ANALYSIS

AND APPRAISAL 16-17 (Feb. 1982); see also Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretaryGeneral, Status as of Dec. 31, 1985, ST/LEG/SER.E/4, Sales No. E.86V.3, at 701 (1986) (numerous industrial nations withhold signatures to protest the Seabed Authority).
An aggregate of 159 nations signed by the deadline, December 9, 1984. Ibrahim, supra at
54 ("The number of signatures obtained in such a short time . . . constitutes a record in the
history of treaty-making."). See also Chart, infra Appendix II (list of Treaty signatories (and
other nations) which have signed the Convention).
211. Note, supra note 160, at 63. "Decisions of a Law of the Sea tribunal that are binding
upon Convention parties could conceivably restrict or regulate activities in the Southern Ocean
and prevent Antarctic Treaty parties from carrying out commercial enterprises within the Treaty
framework." Id. at 63-64.
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gime. For example, unanimous approval by Treaty members is necessary to effectuate a minerals regime. Thus, veto power provides "each
of the decision-making parties, including the United States and Soviet
Union, [with] a stranglehold on future [resource] development in Antarctica. '' 212 Failure to override a cast veto could conceivably result in
unilateral ruin of resources by impatient claimant nations in their
respective sectors.
The previously discussed French airstrip incident highlights
another impediment to acceptance of a minerals regime.213 In theory,
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora
was devised to scrutinize regional activities (i.e., contruction of the
French airstrip) which might be environmentally hazardous. In practice, the regime failed.
C.

World Pressure and an Altruistic Mentality

World pressure to make Antarctica an altruistically managed continent intensifies as development of a minerals regime progresses.
However, if claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica are valid,
then the concept of "common heritage" cannot "supplant or displace
those titles." 214 Unilateral exploration and exploitation would arguably
be a legitimate right of the sovereign nations while sharing of extracted
resourses would be without legal obligation.15
Notwithstanding the issue concerning validity of claims, one point
seems clear: the various interested parties will not abandon their respective positions. For example, claimant nations will not "extinguish
their sovereignty" in the region, and non Treaty member nations will
not tolerate a regime which disregards an altruistic policy.26 Com2
promise seems to be the only remedy for this international stalemate. 17

212. Barcel6, supra note 152, at 156.
213. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the French airstrip
case.
214. Triggs, supra note 10, at 225.
215. Id.
216. See Brennan, supra note 43, at 218-19. See also supra note 179-84 and accompanying
text.
Treaty supporters seem to have the bulk of the world population on their side. Geoffrey F.
Larminie, of the British Petroleum Co., notes that, "by his calculations more than 80% of the
world's population is already represented within the [Treaty System]." See Beeby, supra note
5, at 288 (remarks made during panel discussion on nonliving resources).
217. For example, "[a]ny formulation of a practicable approach to the Antarctic resource
problem must be one that compromises the respective interests of the . . .competing groups
of states." Alexander, supra note 6, at 421. However, Alexander concedes that "[n]o such
.approach, standing alone, can possibly provide for the realization of all objectives." Id. See also
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CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR REFORM AND CLARIFICATION OF
ANTARCTIC REGIMINAL POLICY

The Antarctic Treaty needs to be upheld as an instrument
of peace and cooperation in the area, not excluding, of course,
the capacity of the system to evolve in relation to new requirements and the needs of the international community.
21
- Francisco Orrego Vicuma s
For nearly three decades, the Treaty has been a means by which
many beneficial ends have been achieved, including protection of an
intricate Antarctic ecosystem and mitigation of volatile international
disagreement over sovereignty claims. The Treaty, although not ideal,
should remain authoritative. However, recent developments, such as
overwhelming support for the Convention, negotiation of a minerals
regime, intensifying pressure to disband the Treaty "club" and share
Antarctica's potentially extractable, but speculative, wealth of resources necessitate reform and clarification of regime policy.
Clarification should entail delineation of the parameter, vis-A-vis
waters of the Antarctic region, within which Treaty principles will
apply. Moreover, the Treaty's precise application to these waters,
particularly in relation to other principles applicable under international law, has to be explained. For example, vague Article VI states
that the Treaty's provisions "apply to the area south of sixty degrees
South Latitude . . . but [that] nothing in the present Treaty shall
prejudice or in any way affect the rights . . . of any State under

international law with regard to the high seas in that area." Hence
Article VI has to also be expained. This explanation should include
the inevitable ratification of the Convention. Otherwise, when the
inevitable transpires, so may some complications. Convention Treaty
regimes operating coterminously in Antarctic waters will undoubtedly
29
lead to grave international discontent. 1

Note, supra note 160, at 77 ("Compromise is the only means to rationally develop.., resources
without raising the divisive issues of sovereignty, mandatory technology transfer, and forced
adjudication of rights in Antarctica.").
218. Vicuna, supra note 99, at 68.
219. Cf. Note, supra note 160, at 77 ("The imminent development of an Antarctic offshore
resource regime by the Antarctic Treaty alliance and the simultaneous entry into force of the
Convention of the Law of the Sea will undoubtedly bring the world community into sharp conflict
over the appropriate management [mechanism for the region].").
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Aversion of potential complication calls for reform through peaceful
compromise. That is, principles of both regimes can be, and should
be, compatibly merged to the satisfaction of party nations. Accordingly, an Antarctic EEZ should be established and maintained by
Treaty members acting collectively as the "unquestionable" coastal
sovereign. The waters beyond the EEZ (or continental shelf,
whichever distance is greater) should be recognized as high seas where
all rights and freedoms permitted under the Convention apply. Treaty
members, acting collectively as a coastal sovereign, should be consulted
before activities (i.e., oil exploration and exploitation) are commenced
in the area seaward from the EEZ and south of the Antarctic convergence. A consultation requirement would provide Treaty members
opportunity to scrutinize activities which may adversely infringe upon
their "rights and legitimate interests" (i.e., environmental protection)
as acting coastal sovereigns. This framework for cooperative management of oceanic activity in the Antarctic region is consistent with,
and not prejudicial to, Convention Treaty principles.
Meaningful reform of the Treaty entails additional adjustment of
obsolete, parochial attitudes. As regiminal policy evolves, altruism
with international breadth should be an intrinsic concern of Treaty
members. Notably, an unselfish mentality was manifested during recent negotiations on the new minerals regime for Antarctica. The
consultative parties at the Eleventh Consultative Meeting recommended that "in dealing with the question of mineral resources in
Antarctica, [they] should not prejudice the interests of all mankind."22
But the popular notion that Anatarctica should be a common heritage
is misplaced. Reform should not entail instillation of the common heritage theme into regiminal policy. History teaches us that "stringent,"
yet necessary, environmental regulation is inefficacious in a region
governed by a pure common heritage regime.22 1 Treaty members

220.

See Recommendation XI-1-5(d), reprinted in AUSTRALIAN DEPT OF FOREIGN AF-

FAIRS, HANDBOOK OF MEASURES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 1508 (3d ed. 1983); see also Vicuna, The definition of a regime

on Antarctic mineral resources:basic options, in ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY, supra note
40, at 209-10 ("Consultative parties have made it perfectly clear that the definition of a mineral
resource regime will be worked out with all due regard to the interests of mankind."). But see
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 288 (1986) (the phrase, "note prejudice the interests of mankind,"
is "too negative") (remark by Adriaan Bos, of the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
221. For example, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea governs deep sea
mining in the area identified as the common heritage of mankind. Its provisions are more
concerned with exploitation activities than with environmental protection. In this regard, the
Convention, according to Beeby, is "notably weak." Beeby, supra note 5, at 282.
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should be provided ample time and opportunity to merge their interests with those of the world community - and to do so with their
continued concern for, and understanding of, the region's delicate environment.2 22
Critics of present regiminal policy should not, however, become
passive; past failure to formally protest policy design has been interpreted as an "acquiescence" or approval of the Treaty. 223 Protest should
continue by diplomatic means. For example, an appropriate and effective mechanism is a United Nations resolution which comprises a forceful recommendation that Treaty members develop an internationally
altruistic and effective policy.
Specifically, this altruistic policy should reflect consideration of the
following issues: (1) practicable regulation and maintenance of regional
resource activities with an emphasis on environmental protection and
preservation; (2) access to the region by qualified entities for commercial purposes; 224 (3) collection and equitable sharing of revenue procured
and (4) equitable
from entities engaged in commercial activities;225 226
sharing of natural resources, living and non-living.
Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty Regime could become the
setting for an international politico-legal nightmare just waiting to
happen. Compromising world leaders have to act expeditiously and
decisively to avert this gloomy prospect.

222. "It is necessary to keep and strengthen the Antarctic Treaty, under whose protection
an extensive area of the earth has been understood, preserved and developed." See Cruz, The
InternationalCommunity and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 471 (1978).
223. Triggs, supra note 10, at 223; Rich, supranote 163, at 715. Moreover, "the international
community has acquiesced to the Antarctic Treaty because for 25 years it has accepted the
treaty as a valid vehicle for the preservation of peace in the area." Beeby, supra note 5, at
278 (remark by Rudiger Wolfrum during a panel discussion on the legal and political background
of the Treaty).
224. See Note, supra note 160, at 76-77 (Treaty members could lease exploitation rights
to Enterprise and private companies).
225. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 418 (suggesting the creation of a trust fund to aid
the Third World).
226. See, e.g., Scully, The Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System, in ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM 391, 399 (1986); Panel Discussion on Conservation and Environment, in
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 211, 216-18 (1986); Brennan, supra note 43, at 222-27; Charney,
supra note 148, at 230-31.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/1

40

Bergin: Antarctica,
the Antarctic
Regime,
and Legal and Geopolitic
ANTARCTICA:
NATURAL Treaty
RESOURCE
EXPLORATION

APPENDIX I
The Antarctic Treaty*
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the
French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South
Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America.
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica
shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
shall not become the scene or object of international discord;
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge
resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in
Antarctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom
of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the
progress of all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for
peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony
in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles enbodied in the
Charter of the United Nations;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall
be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as
the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out
of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel
or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.
Article II
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation
toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year,
shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.
Article III
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty,
the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and
practicable:
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information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exhanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations;
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between
expeditions and stations;
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be
exchanged and made freely available.
2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given
to the establishment of cooperative working relations with those
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other international
organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.
(a)

Article IV
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which
it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of
its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards
its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right
of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in
force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of
sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while
the present Treaty is in force.
Article VI
1. Any nuclear explosion in Antartica and the disposal there of
radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.
2. In the event of the conslusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the
disposal of radio active waste material, to which all of the Contracting
Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established
under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.
Article VI
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south
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of sixty degrees (600) South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but
nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the
rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international
law with regard to the high seas within that area.
Article VII
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of
the provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to
in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers
to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate
them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other
Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like
notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment.
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at
any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and
equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of
discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be
open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all
areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right
to designate observers.
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty
enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and
thereafter shall given them notice in advance, of
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its
ships and nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized
in or proceeding from its territory;
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced
by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in
paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty.
Article VIII
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the
present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of
the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons
in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII
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and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1(b) of Article
III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting
Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions
occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising
their functions.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article,
and pending the adoption of measures in the pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case
of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica
shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually
acceptable solution.
Article IX
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble
to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two
months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter
at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining
to Antarctia, and formulating and considering, and recommending to
their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided
for in Article VII of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present
Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint
representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph
1 of the present Article, during such time as that Contracting party
demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducing substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific
station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition.
Article VIII
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the
present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of
the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons
in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII
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and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1(b) of Article
III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting
Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions
occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising
their functions.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article,
and pending the adoption of measures in the pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case
of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica
shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually
acceptable solution.
Article IX
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble
to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two
months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter
at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining
to Antarctia, and formulating and considering, and recommending to
their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided
for in Article VII of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present
Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint
representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph
1 of the present Article, during such time as that Contracting party
demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducing substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific
station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition.
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1
of the present Article.
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall
become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties whose
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representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to
consider those measures.
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be
exercised as from the date of entry into force of the Treaty whether
or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been
proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article.
Article X
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate
efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end
that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the
principles or purposes of the present Treaty.
Article XI
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present
Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with
a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the
International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach
agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve
parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to
resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph
1 of this Article.
Article XII
1. (a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time
by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under
Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force
when the depositary Government has received notice from all such
Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.
(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into
force as to any other Contracting Party when notice of ratification by
it has been received by the depositary Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received within
a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the
present Treaty on the date of the expiration of such period.
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2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry
into force of the present Treaty, and of the Contracting Parties whose
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided
for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the
depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties
shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the
Treaty.
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which
is approved such as a Conference by a majority of the Contracting
Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for
under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties immediately after the termination
of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph 1, of the present Article.
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into
force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this
Article within a period of two years after the date of its communication
to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Parties, may at any
time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depositary
Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice by
the depositary Government.
Article XIII
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
States. It shall be open for accession by any State which is a Member
of the United Nations, or by any other State which may be invited
to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties
whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the Treaty.
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected
by each State in accordance with its constitutional processes.
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Government of the United States of America,
hereby designated as the depositary Government.
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or
accession, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty and of any
modification or amendment thereto.
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory
States, the present Treaty shall enter into force for those States and
for States which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter
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the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the
deposit of its instrument of accession.
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XIV
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian, and
Spanish Languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of
America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the
Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
* Antarctica Treaty between the United States of America and
Other Governments, signed at Washington, D.C., December 1, 1959.
Conference on Antarctica, Washington, D.C., 1959. Treaties and Other
International Acts Series, No. 4780 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1961).
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